

Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Scepticism

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3

i The most fundamental difference among philosophies

[1] When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery, or a denial of discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. [2] This, no doubt, is why in the case of philosophical investigations, too, some have said that they have discovered the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating.

[3] Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth – for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others. The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics, have asserted that things cannot be apprehended.¹ And the Sceptics are still investigating. [4] Hence the most fundamental kinds of philosophy are reasonably thought to be three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptical. The former two it will be appropriate for others to describe: in the present work we shall discuss in outline² the Sceptical persuasion. By way of preface let us say that on none of the matters to be discussed do we affirm that things certainly are just as we say they are: rather, we report³ descriptively on each item according to how it appears to us at the time.⁴

ii The accounts constitutive of Scepticism

[5] The Sceptical philosophy contains both a general and a specific account.⁵ In the general account we set out the distinctive character of Scepticism, saying what the concept of it is, what are its principles and

¹ The same is said of the Cyrenaics at I 215. For the New Academics see I 220–31; and note that other sources expressly say that the Academics did *not* 'assert that things cannot be apprehended'.

² *ἑπολιτικῶς*: the work is an outline or *ὑποτίττω*; and Sextus frequently reminds us of the fact: I 206, 222, 239; II i, 79, 185, 194; III i, 114, 167, 279. Note also his assurances that he is only offering 'few out of many' examples (I 68, note) and that he is concerned to be brief (I 163, note); and see I 94; II 84, 212; III 56, 71, 135, 168.

³ For this use of the term 'report' see I 15, 197, 203.

⁴ Cf. e.g. I 191; II 187.

⁵ Cf. *M* VII 1.

Outlines of Scepticism

what its arguments, what is its standard and what its aim, what are the modes of suspension of judgement, how we understand sceptical assertions, and what distinguishes Scepticism from neighbouring philosophies.⁶ [6] The specific account is the one in which we argue against each of the parts of what they call philosophy.

Let us first deal with the general account, beginning our sketch with the names given to the Sceptical persuasion.

iii The nomenclature of Scepticism

[7] The Sceptical persuasion, then, is also called Investigative, from its activity in investigating and inquiring,⁸ Suspensive, from the feeling that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation; Aporetic, either (as some say) from the fact that it puzzles over⁹ and investigates everything, or else from its being at a loss whether to assent or deny; and Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have attached himself to Scepticism more systematically and consciously than anyone before him.¹⁰

iv What is Scepticism?

[8] Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all,¹¹ an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquility.

[9] We call it an ability not in any fancy sense, but simply in the sense of 'to be able to'. Things which appear we take in the present context to be objects of perception, which is why we contrast them with objects of thought. In any way at all¹² can be taken either with 'an ability' (to show that we are to understand the word 'ability' in its straightforward sense, as we said), or else with 'to set out oppositions

⁶ The programme (with which compare the resumé at I 209) corresponds well to the contents of *PH I* – except that I 13–20 do not appear to be covered.
⁷ With I 7 cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 69–70.
⁸ The verb translated 'inquire' is *ἀκέρεισθαι*, cognate with *ἀκέρεικός* ('sceptical').
⁹ 'Puzzle over' renders *ἀπορείν*, from which 'aporetic' derives.
¹⁰ On this explanation of the name 'Pyrrhonian' see BARRES [1992], pp. 4284–6.
¹¹ See Diogenes Laertius IX 78 (reporting Anesidemus).

among the things which appear and are thought of: we say 'in any way at all' because we set up oppositions in a variety of ways – opposing what appears to what appears, what is thought of to what is thought of, and crosswise, so as to include all the oppositions.¹² Or else we take the phrase with¹³ 'the things which appear and are thought of', to show that we are not to investigate how what appears appears or how what is thought of is thought of, but are simply to take them for granted.¹³

[10] By 'opposed accounts' we do not necessarily have in mind affirmation and negation, but take the phrase simply in the sense of 'conflicting accounts'.¹⁴ By 'equipollence' we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more convincing.¹⁵ Suspension of judgement is a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything.¹⁶ Tranquility¹⁷ is freedom from disturbance or calmness of soul. We shall suggest in the chapter on the aim of scepticism how tranquility accompanies suspension of judgement.¹⁸

v The Sceptic

[11] The Pyrrhonian philosopher has been implicitly defined in our account of the concept of the Sceptical persuasion: a Pyrrhonian is someone who possesses this ability.

vi The principles of Scepticism

[12] The causal principle of scepticism we say is the hope of becoming tranquil.¹⁹ Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly in things and

¹² Reading *ἡ τῷ* in place of *ἡ καθ'* *οὐκὼνταρε* *τρόπον*, as Mau suggests. The sense is not in doubt, and Mau's emendation makes it clear.

¹³ See I 31–2; *M VIII* 46.

¹⁴ Cf. I 19.

¹⁵ Cf. I, 190, 198, 202.

¹⁶ See I 190, cf. 196, 198, 202.

¹⁷ See I 196 (and cf. I 192, on non-assertion); and note esp. COURSSIN [1929].
¹⁸ *ἀτροπέσι*: 'untroubledness' – the word is formed from an alpha privative and *τροπέειν*, 'to trouble'.

¹⁹ Cf. I 26; see STRIKER [1990a]; ANTRAS [1993a], ch. 8.

55

Outlines of Scepticism

puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would become tranquil.

The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed,²⁰ for it is from this, we think, that we come to hold no beliefs.

vii Do Sceptics hold beliefs?²¹

[13] When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take 'belief' in the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances²² – for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences;²³ for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear.

[14] Not even in uttering the Sceptical phrases about unclear matters – for example, 'In no way more', or 'I determine nothing', or one of the other phrases which we shall later discuss²⁴ – do they hold beliefs. For if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things you are said to hold beliefs about; but Sceptics posit these phrases not as necessarily being real. For they suppose that, just as the phrase 'Everything is false' says that it too, along with everything else, is false (and similarly for 'Nothing is true'), so also 'In no way more' says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence it cancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of the other Sceptical phrases. [15] Thus, if people who hold beliefs posit as real the things they hold beliefs about, while Sceptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled by

²⁰ See I 202–5 (cf. I 18).

²¹ The Dogmatists alleged that the Sceptics did in fact hold beliefs: see e.g. Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 9–12; Diogenes Laertius IX 102–4 (cf. IX 68). – On the controversy surrounding the issues raised by this chapter see FREDÉ [1979]; BURNYEAT [1982a], [1984]; BARNES [1988], [1990a], pp. 2617–49.

²² Cf. I 29, 193, 229–30; II 10.

²³ Cf. I 16, 193, 197.

²⁴ See I 187–208.

themselves, then they cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them.²⁵

But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects.²⁶

viii Do Sceptics belong to a school?²⁷

[16] We take the same attitude to the question: Do Sceptics belong to a school? If you say that a school involves adherence to a number of beliefs which cohere both with one another and with what is apparent,²⁸ and if you say that belief is assent to something unclear, then we shall say that Sceptics do not belong to any school. [17] But if you count as a school a persuasion which, to all appearances, coheres with some account, the account showing how it is possible to live^b correctly (where 'correctly' is taken not only with reference to virtue, but more loosely, and extends to the ability to suspend judgement^c) – in that case we say that Sceptics do belong to a school. For we coherently follow, to all appearances, an account which shows us a life in conformity with traditional customs and the law and persuasions and our own feelings.

ix Do Sceptics study natural science?

[18] We say something similar again when investigating the question of whether Sceptics should study natural science. We do not study

^b Deleting *δοκείν*, as Mutschmann suggested.

^c We close the parenthesis after *δυσκρίτωντος* rather than after *ἀφελέστερον*: the clause καὶ . . . *ἀνακρίτωντος* is part of the gloss on *ὁρθός* and not explanatory of *τοῦ λόγου*.

²⁵ Cf. I 206.

²⁶ Cf. I 208.

²⁷ Some denied that Pyrrhonism constituted a school of philosophy: see Diogenes Laertius I 20; cf. Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 30; Clement, *strom.* VIII iv 16.2. On the concept of a school see GLUCKER [1978].

²⁸ 'Cohere with' etc., here and in the section, translate *ἀκολουθεῖν* and its cognate noun. The verb literally means 'follow', and so we normally translate it (we also use 'follow' for the compounds *κατακολουθεῖν* and *παρακολουθεῖν* and for *ἔρεσθαι*); but, for the noun, 'implication' and 'validity' have sometimes been preferred, and the adjective *ἀκόλουθος* comes out as 'apposite'.

Outlines of Scepticism

natural science in order to make assertions with firm conviction about any of the matters on which scientific beliefs are held. But we do touch on natural science in order to be able to oppose to every account an equal account,²⁹ and for the sake of tranquillity.³⁰ This is also the spirit in which we approach the logical and ethical parts of what they call philosophy.³¹

x Do Sceptics reject what is apparent?³²

[19] Those who say that the Sceptics reject what is apparent have not, I think, listened to what we say.³³ As we said before,³⁴ we do not overturn anything which leads us, without our willing it, to assent in accordance with a passive appearance – and these things are precisely what is apparent. When we investigate whether existing things are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent – and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. [20] For example,^d it appears to us that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a perceptual way); but whether (as far as the argument goes³⁵) it is actually sweet is something we investigate – and this is not what is apparent but something said about what is apparent.³⁶

And if we do propound arguments directly against what is apparent, it is not because we want to reject what is apparent that we set them out, but rather to display the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reasoning is such a deceiver that it all but snatches even what is apparent from under our very eyes, surely we should keep watch on it in unclear matters, to avoid being led into rashness by following it?

^d Retaining the mss text: Mutschmann–Mau follow Heintz in adding <δρα, μέν>.

²⁹ See I 12.

³⁰ See I 10, 25–30.

³¹ For the three parts of philosophy see II 12–13.

³² See Diogenes Laertius IX 103–4.

³³ For other complaints of misrepresentation see I 200, 208.

³⁴ See I 13, 17.

³⁵ The same Greek phrase occurs frequently elsewhere, and its meaning is usually plain; but here its import is obscure and different scholars have construed it in different ways: see BRUNSCHWIG [1990].

³⁶ Cf. II 72 (and on honey see I 101).

xi The standard of Scepticism³⁷

[21]³⁸ That we attend to what is apparent is clear from what we say about the standard of the Sceptical persuasion. 'Standard' has two senses: there are standards adopted to provide conviction about the reality or unreality of something (we shall talk about these standards when we turn to attack them³⁹); and there are standards of action, attending to which in everyday life we perform some actions and not others – and it is these standards which are our present subject.

[22] We say, then, that the standard of the Sceptical persuasion is what is apparent,⁴⁰ implicitly meaning by this the appearances; for they depend on passive and unwilling feelings and are not objects of investigation. (Hence no-one, presumably, will raise a controversy over whether an existing thing appears this way or that; rather, they investigate whether it is such as it appears.)

[23]⁴¹ Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we are not able to be utterly inactive.⁴² These everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. [24] By nature's guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking.⁴³ By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst to drink. By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad.⁴⁴ By teaching of kinds of expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept.⁴⁵

And we say all this without holding any opinions.

³⁷ On the notion of a standard or κριτήριον see STRIKER [1974], [1990b]; HUBY and NEAL [1989].

³⁸ Cf. *M* VII 29–31.

³⁹ See II 14–17.

⁴⁰ See Diogenes Laertius IX 106, reporting the view of Aenesidemus.

⁴¹ With I 23–4 compare I 237–9 (cf. I 226, 231; II 102, 246, 254; III 2, 119, 151, 233); see e.g. BARNES [1990a], pp. 264–5; ANNAS [1993a], ch. 8.

⁴² On the question, Can the Sceptic Live? see *M* XI 162–166; Diogenes Laertius IX 104–105; Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 25–6; see e.g. BURNYEAT [1980a]; BARNES [1988a], [1990b].

⁴³ See e.g. *M* VIII 203.

⁴⁴ Cf. III 2; *M* IX 49.

⁴⁵ For types of expertise allegedly acceptable to Sceptics see *M* I 99; V 1–3.

xii What is the aim of Scepticism?

[25]⁴⁶ It will be apposite to consider next the aim of the Sceptical persuasion. Now an aim is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not itself done or considered for the sake of anything else.⁴⁷ Or: an aim is the final object of desire.⁴⁸ Up to now we say the aim of the Sceptic is tranquillity in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. [26] For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil,⁴⁹ but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgement. And when they suspended judgement, tranquillity in matters of opinion followed fortuitously.

[27]⁵⁰ For those who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason and measure, and in fear of change they do anything so as not to lose what they believe to be good. [28] But those who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil.

A story told of the painter Apelles applies to the Sceptics.⁵¹ They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather on the horse's mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the

⁴⁶ With I 25-30 cf. III 237-8, *M* XI 110-67; Timon, frag. 84; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (see BURNEYAT [1980b]); Diogenes Laertius IX 107-8. See esp. STRIKER [1990a]; ANNAS [1993a], chh. 1, 17.

⁴⁷ A standard definition: e.g. Cicero, *fin* I xii 42 (Epicureans); Arius ap. Stobaeus, *ed* II 77.16-17 (Stoics), 131.2-4 (Peripatetics).

⁴⁸ Again, a standard definition; see e.g. Arius ap. Stobaeus, *ed* II 76.21-4 (Stoics), 131.4 (Peripatetics); Alexander, *an* *meth* 150.20-1, 162.34.

⁴⁹ See I 12.

⁵⁰ Cf. III 237-8; *M* XI 112-18, 145-6 (and below, I 215).

⁵¹ On this paragraph see ANNAS and BARNES [1983], pp. 167-171.

picture, it produced a representation of the horse's lather. [29] Now the Sceptics were hoping to acquire tranquillity by deciding the anomalies in what appears and is thought of, and being unable to do this they suspended judgement. But when they suspended judgement, tranquillity followed as it were fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body.⁵²

We do not, however, take Sceptics to be undisturbed in every way⁵³ - we say that they are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of this kind.⁵⁴ [30] But in these cases ordinary people are afflicted by two sets of circumstances: by the feelings themselves, and no less by believing that these circumstances are bad by nature. Sceptics, who shed the additional opinion that each of these things is bad in its nature, come off more moderately even in these cases.

This, then, is why we say that the aim of Sceptics is tranquillity in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. (Some eminent Sceptics have added as a further aim suspension of judgement in investigations.⁵⁵)

xiii The general modes of suspension of judgement

[31] Since we have been saying that tranquillity follows suspension of judgement about everything, it will be apposite here to say how suspension of judgement comes about for us.

It comes about - to put it rather generally - through the opposition of things. We oppose what appears to what appears, or what is thought of to what is thought of, or crosswise.⁵⁶ [32] For example, we oppose what appears to what appears when we say: 'The same tower appears round from a distance and square from nearby.'⁵⁷ We oppose

⁵² See Diogenes Laertius IX 107 (referring the image to Timon and Aenesidemus); below, I 205.

⁵³ Cf. III 235-6; *M* XI 141-60.

⁵⁴ See I 13.

⁵⁵ So Timon and Aenesidemus, according to Diogenes Laertius IX 107.

⁵⁶ See I 8-9.

⁵⁷ A standard example: e.g. I 118; II 55; *M* VII 208, 414; Laetius IV 353-65; see ANNAS and BARNES [1983], pp. 104-6.

what is thought of to what is thought of when, against those who seek to establish that there is Providence from the orderliness of the heavenly bodies, we oppose the view that often the good do badly while the bad do well and conclude from this that there is no Providence.⁵⁸ [33] We oppose what is thought of to what appears, as Anaxagoras did when to the view that snow is white,^c he opposed the thought that snow is frozen water and water is black and snow is therefore black.⁵⁹

In another sense we sometimes oppose present things to present things (as in the above examples) and sometimes present to past or future things. For example, when someone propounds to us an argument we cannot refute, [34] we say to him: 'Before the founder of the school to which you adhere was born, the argument of the school, which is no doubt sound, was not yet apparent, although it was really there in nature. In the same way, it is possible that the argument opposing the one you have just propounded is really there in nature but is not yet apparent to us; so we should not yet assent to what is now thought to be a powerful argument'.⁶⁰

xiv The Ten Modes⁶¹

[35] So that we may get a more accurate impression of these oppositions, I shall set down the modes through which we conclude to suspension of judgement. But I make no affirmation either about their number or about their power — they may be unsound, and there may be more than those I shall describe.

[36] The older sceptics⁶² normally offer ten modes in number through which we are thought to conclude to suspension of judge-

^c Like Mau, we reject Mutschmann's insertion of *κατασκευάζοντα*.

⁵⁸ Cf. I 151.

⁵⁹ Cf. II 244.

⁶⁰ With this compare the occasional appeal to merely possible examples: I 89, 96, 143; II 40; III 233-4.

⁶¹ On this chapter see ANNAS and BARNES [1985]; and for the comparison between Sextus and Diogenes Laertius see BARNES [1992], pp. 4273-9 (with bibliography).

⁶² They contrast with the more recent sceptics of I 164; at *M* VII 345 Sextus refers to Aenesidemus as author of the Ten Modes (but it is not clear how closely he is following Aenesidemus here in *PH*).

ment. (They use 'arguments' and 'schemata' as synonyms for 'modes'.) They are:⁶³ first, the mode depending on the variations among animals; second, that depending on the differences among humans; third, that depending on the differing constitutions of the sense-organs; fourth, that depending on circumstances; fifth, that depending on positions and intervals and places; sixth, that depending on admixtures; [37] seventh, that depending on the quantities and preparations of existing things; eighth, that deriving from relativity; ninth, that depending on frequent or rare encounters; tenth, that depending on persuasions and customs and laws and belief in myths and dogmatic suppositions. [38] (We use this order for the sake of argument.⁶⁴)

Superordinate to these are three modes: that deriving from the subject judging; that deriving from the object judged; that combined from both. For under the mode deriving from the subject judging are ranged the first four, since what judges is either an animal or a human or a sense, and 'is in some circumstance. The seventh and tenth are referred to the mode deriving from the object judged. The fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the mode combined from both. [39] These three are in turn referred to the relativity mode. So we have as most generic relativity, as specific the three, as subordinate the ten.⁶⁵

So much by way of a plausible account of their number: now for their power.

^f Reading *καί* with the MSS. Mutschmann-Mau emend to *ἢ* ('or').

⁶³ Cf. Diogenes Laertius XI 78-9; Philo, *ebtr* 169-70; Aristocles, *apud* Eusebius, *PE*, XIV xviii 11-12.

⁶⁴ For alternative orderings of the modes see Diogenes Laertius IX 87: cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 26-30; BARNES [1992], pp. 4278-9.

⁶⁵ Compare the taxonomy at I 136; cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 141-2.

[81] In our individual peculiarities we differ in such a way that some people digest beef more easily than rock-fish, and get diarrhoea from weak Lesbian wine. There was (so they say) an old woman in Attica who consumed four ounces of hemlock without harm. Lysis actually took half an ounce of opium without distress. [82] Demophon, Alexander's waiter, used to shiver when he was in the sun or the baths and felt warm in the shade. When Athenagoras of Argos was stung by scorpions or poisonous spiders he was not hurt. The Psyllaeans, as they are called, are not harmed when bitten by snakes or asps, [83] and the Tenyritae in Egypt are not harmed by crocodiles. Further, the Ethiopians who live by the river Astapus on the other side of Meroe eat scorpions and snakes without harm. When Rufinus — the one from Chalcis — drank hellebore he neither vomited nor suffered any other purgative effects, but consumed and digested it as though it were something normal. [84] If Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor ever consumed pepper he suffered a heart attack. If Soterichus the surgeon ever smelt sheathfish cooking he was seized by diarrhoea. Andron of Argos was so free from thirst that he travelled through waterless Libya without seeking drink. The Emperor Tiberius could see in the dark. Aristotle describes a Thasian who thought that the image of a man was always preceding him.¹⁰⁰

[85] Since there is such variation among humans in body (to be satisfied with a few examples out of the many,¹⁰¹ which the Dogmatists provide^o), it is likely that humans differ from one another in their souls too; for, as the science of physiognomy shows, the body is a kind of picture of the soul.¹⁰²

The chief indication of the great — indeed infinite — differences among humans with regard to their intellect is the dispute among the Dogmatists about various matters and in particular about what we should choose and what reject. [86] The poets have got it right here. Pindar says:

P Retaining τὸν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένον, which Murschmann-Mau follow Heintz in deleting.

¹⁰⁰ See Aristotle, *Meteorology* 373a35–b10; cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 61.
¹⁰¹ Cf. I 58.
¹⁰² Cf. II 101; *M* VIII 155, 173.

Sextus, verroly

[79]⁹⁷ Such is the first mode of suspension of judgement. The second, we said, was the mode deriving from the differences among humans. For even were one to concede by way of hypothesis that humans are more convincing than the irrational animals, we shall find that suspension of judgement is brought in insofar as our own differences go.

There are two things from which humans are said to be composed, soul and body, and in both these we differ from one another. For example, in body we differ in our shapes and our individual peculiarities.⁹⁸ [80] There is a difference in shape between the body of a Scythian and an Indian's body, and what produces the variation, so they say, is the different dominance of the humours. Depending on the different dominance of the humours, the appearances too become different, as we established in our first argument.⁹⁹ Further, in virtue of these humours there are many differences in our choice and avoidance of external things; for Indians enjoy different things from us, and enjoying different things shows that varying appearances come from existing objects.

^o Retaining the second, inelegant ἐμπροσθεν, which Murschmann-Mau excise.

⁹⁶ I.e. at I 62.
⁹⁷ With I 79–90 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 80–1; Philo, *debr* 176–7; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 57–65.

⁹⁸ Or ιδιοσυγκρασίας, ἰδιοσυγκροτοῖσι ('individual commixtures (of the humours)'): 'Most doctors, I think, name these things idiosyncrasies — and they all agree that they are inapprehensible' (Galen, *On the Therapeutic Method* 1.209 Kühn).
⁹⁹ See I 52 (cf. I 46).

One man is gladdened by the honours and garlands of his storm-footed horses, another by life in gilded palaces; another rejoices as he crosses the swell of the sea in a swift ship.¹⁰³

And Homer says:

Different men rejoice in different deeds.¹⁰⁴

Tragedy too is full of such things:

If nature had made the same things fine and wise for all alike, there would be no disputatious strife among human kind.¹⁰⁵

And again:

Strange that the same thing should please some mortals but by others be hated.¹⁰⁶

[87] Since, therefore, choice and avoidance are located in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in perception and appearance, then when some choose and others avoid the same things, it is apposite for us to deduce that they are not similarly affected by the same things, since otherwise they would have chosen and rejected the same things in similar ways.¹⁰⁷ But if the same things affect humans differently depending on the differences among them, then it is likely that suspension of judgement will be introduced in this way too, since we are no doubt able to say how each existing thing appears, with reference to each difference, but are not able to assert what it is in its nature.

[88] For we shall be convinced either by all humans or by some. If by all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting opposed views. But if by some, then let them say to whom we should assent. The Platonist will say 'to Plato', the Epicurean to Epicurus', and the others analogously, and so by their undecidable dissensions¹⁰⁸ they will bring us round again to suspension of judgement.

¹⁰³ frag. 221 Snell.

¹⁰⁴ *Odyssey* XIV 228.

¹⁰⁵ Euripides, *Phoenissae* 499-500.

¹⁰⁶ Unknown, frag. 462 Kannicht/Snell.

¹⁰⁷ See I 57.

¹⁰⁸ 'Undecidable' translates ἀνερρίκτῳς - but see BARNES [1990d], pp. 17-19.

[89] Anyone who says that we should assent to the majority view is making a puerile suggestion. Nobody can canvass all mankind and work out what is the preference of the majority,¹⁰⁹ it being possible¹¹⁰ that among some nations of which we have no knowledge what is rare with us is true of the majority and what is true of most of us is there rare - for example, that most people when bitten by poisonous spiders do not suffer though some occasionally do suffer, and analogously with the other individual peculiarities I mentioned earlier. So suspension of judgement is necessarily introduced by way of the differences among humans too.

[90] When the self-satisfied Dogmatists say that they themselves should be preferred to other humans in judging things, we know that their claim is absurd. For they are themselves a part of the dispute, and it is by preferring themselves that they judge what is apparent, then by entrusting the judging to themselves they are taking for granted the matter being investigated before beginning the judging.

[91]¹¹¹ Nonetheless, so as to arrive at suspension of judgement even when resting the argument on a single person, such as the Sage they dream up,¹¹² we bring out the mode which is third in order. This, we said, is the one deriving from the differences among the senses.

Now, that the senses disagree with one another is clear. [92] For instance, paintings seem to sight to have recesses and projections, but not to touch.¹¹³ Honey appears pleasant to the tongue (for some people) but unpleasant to the eyes; it is impossible, therefore, to say whether it is purely pleasant or unpleasant. Similarly with perfume: it gratifies the sense of smell but displeases the sense of taste. [93] Again, since spurge-juice is painful to the eyes but painless to the rest of the body, we will not be able to say whether, so far as its own nature goes, it is purely painless to bodies or painful. Rainwater is beneficial to the

¹⁰⁹ Cf. II 45 (and also e.g. Cicero, *nat. deorum* I xxiii 62).

¹¹⁰ Cf. I 34.

¹¹¹ With I 91-9 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 81; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 68-77.

¹¹² For the Dogmatic, and especially Stoic, notion of the Sage see II 38, 83; II 240.

The Sage, who is also virtuous and embodies all human perfection, is an ideal, a logical construction put together for philosophical purposes. The numerous texts on the Stoic Sage are collected in VON ARNIM [1903-5] III 544-684.

¹¹³ Cf. I 120 (and note Plato, *Republic* 602C-603B).

eyes, but is rough on the windpipe and lungs – so too is olive oil, though it comforts the skin. The sea-ray, when applied to the extremities, paralyses them, but can be put on the rest of the body harmlessly. Hence we will not be able to say what each of these things is like in its nature, although it is possible to say what they appear to be like on any given occasion.

[94] More cases than these can be given; but so as not to waste time, given the purpose⁹ of our essay,¹¹⁴ we should say this. Each of the objects of perception which appears to us seems to impress us in a variety of ways – for example, an apple is smooth, fragrant, sweet, and yellow.¹¹⁵ It is unclear, then, whether in reality it has these qualities alone, or has only one quality but appears different depending on the different constitution of the sense-organs, or actually has more qualities than those which are apparent, some of them not making an impression on us.

[95] That it has only one quality can be argued from what we said before¹¹⁶ about the nourishment dispersed in our bodies and the water dispersed in trees and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple can be undifferentiated but observed as different depending on the differences among the sense-organs by which it is grasped.

[96] That the apple may have more qualities than those apparent to us we deduce as follows. Let us conceive of¹¹⁷ someone who from birth has touch, smell and taste, but who hears and sees nothing. He will suppose that there is absolutely nothing visible or audible, and that there exist only those three kinds of quality which he is able to grasp. [97] So it is possible that we too, having only the five senses, grasp from among the qualities of the apple⁸ only those we are capable of grasping, although other qualities can exist, impressing other

⁹ Deleting τοῦ τρόπου (Mutschmann).
¹ We follow the mss text: Mutschmann–Mau excise ἐν before αἰσθητοῖς and add ἐμπνευομένου after ὀργάνους.
⁸ Retaining ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιότητων, deleted by Mutschmann–Mau after Heintz.

¹¹⁴ See I 4, note.
¹¹⁵ Cf. *M* VII 103.
¹¹⁶ I 53–4.
¹¹⁷ Cf. I 34, note.

sense-organs in which we have no share, so that we do not grasp the objects perceptible by them.¹

[98] But nature, someone will say, has made the senses commensurate with their objects.¹¹⁸ What nature? – given that there is so much undecidable dispute among the Dogmatists about the reality of what is according to nature. For if someone decides this question (namely, whether there is such a thing as nature), then if he is a layman he will not be convincing according to them, while if he is a philosopher he will be part of the dispute and under judgement himself rather than a judge.

[99] So if it is possible¹¹⁹ that only those qualities exist in the apple which we think we grasp, and that there are more than them, and again that there are not even those which make an impression on us, then it will be unclear to us what the apple is like.

The same argument applies to the other objects of perception too. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, the intellect is not able to apprehend them either (since its guides fail it¹¹⁹), so by means of this argument too we shall be thought to conclude to suspension of judgement about external existing objects.

[100]¹²⁰ In order to end up with suspension of judgement even if we rest the argument on any single sense or actually leave the senses aside, we also adopt the fourth mode of suspension. This is the mode which gets its name from circumstances, where by 'circumstances' we mean conditions. It is observed, we say, in natural or unnatural states, in waking or sleeping, depending on age, on moving or being at rest, on hating or loving, on being in need or sated, on being drunk or sober, on anterior conditions, on being confident or fearful, on being in distress or in a state of enjoyment.¹²¹

¹ Reading κατ' αὐτὰ for κατ' αὐτὰς (mss, Mutschmann–Mau). See ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 185.
¹¹⁸ Reading εἰ ἐγγράμματα (Heintz): ἐνεχόμενα (mss ungrammatically), <εἰ> ἐνεχόμενα (Mutschmann–Mau).

¹¹⁹ Cf. *M* IX 94, citing Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I IV 2; and see e.g. Apuleius, *dog* *Phil* I XIV 209.

¹²⁰ See I 128 (cf. II 63); and compare Democritus, frag. 123 Diels–Kranz.
¹²¹ With I 100–17 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 82; *Phil*, *ehr* 178–80; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 82–98.

¹²² Cf. II 51–6 for a reprise, and I 218–19 (with *M* VII 61–4) where the same material is used in Sextus' account of Protagoreanism.

62

Vragen over Sextus Empiricus.

- 1) Lees eerst § 1 t/m 12 en kijk of je dan de volgende vragen kunt beantwoorden:
 - a) Wat ziet Sextus als kenmerkend voor een Sceptische houding tegenover de waarheid?
 - b) Hoe wordt de opschorting van het oordeel gerechtvaardigd?
 - c) Welk (moreel-psychologisch) resultaat vloeit uit de Sceptische houding voort?
- 2) § 13-14: a) Hoe beargumenteert Sextus dat de Scepticus geen oordelen ('beliefs') heeft? b) Hoe kan hij dan normaal functioneren (zie ook § 21-24)?
- 3) § 16-7: In welk opzicht is het Scepticisme geen school en in welk opzicht wel?
- 4) § 17, eind: waarom zou een Scepticus leven in overeenstemming met traditionele gewoonten, de wet en bestaande overtuigingen (vgl. ook § 23)?
- 5) In hoeverre is de Scepticus geïnteresseerd in natuurwetenschap?
- 6) § 21-4: wat is dus de functie en status van 'wat toeschijnt' ('what is apparent')?
- 7) § 27-30: wat is de pointe van het voorbeeld van de wanhopige schilder Apelles?
- 8) § 35 e.v. Wat verstaat Sextus onder een 'wijze' of 'modus' (d.w.z. Eng. 'mode').
- 9) § 80-90: de behandeling van de tweede 'wijze' valt in twee delen uiteen: welke zijn dit?
- 10) § 81 e.v. Waarom ondersteunen deze voorbeelden van ongewone fysieke reacties het Sceptische standpunt?
- 11) § 88 ff. Waarom kan de Scepticus niet kiezen voor één van de dogmatische scholen?